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Recent Developments 
Hernandez v. State 
When Requested by Counsel, Trial Court Must Ask Specific Voir Dire Questions 
Regarding Potential Racial Bias 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that even in 
the absence of evidence suggesting 
potential bias, the trial court must ask 
specific voir dire questions regarding 
racial bias when requested to do so 
by counsel. Hernandez v. State, 357 
Md. 204, 742 A.2d 952 (1999). The 
court opined that a trial court's refusal 
to racially particularize a voir dire 
question at the re'quest of counsel 
constituted reversible error. In so 
holding, the court of appeals 
unequivocally stated that a showing of 
"special circumstances" of the 
likelihood of racial bias among the 
jurors is not a prerequisite to receive 
racially specific voir dire questions. 
Petitioner, Jorge Hernandez 
("Hernandez"), a Hispanic, was 
convicted in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County of child abuse 
and second-degree rape. At trial, 
Hernandez testified in Spanish through 
an interpreter. The state proved that 
Hernandez had vaginal intercourse 
with the nine year old Hispanic 
daughter of the woman with whom he 
lived. 
During the voir dire process, the 
defense counsel requested a racially 
specific voir dire question. Instead of 
Hernandez's proposed voir dire 
question, the court stated to 
prospective jurors that "they should 
be as free as humanly possible from 
prejudice, sympathy, and 
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preconceived ideas for or against 
either party." The court refused to 
racially particularize the question, even 
after the prosecution urged it to do 
so. 
After . his conviction, 
Hernandez's motion for a new trial 
was denied. Hernandez appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. The court of special 
appeals affirmed the lower court's 
ruling. Hernandez sought a writ of 
certiorari, which was granted by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by considering the 
development of federal law on voir 
dire pertaining to racial prejudices. 
Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 
742 A.2d 952 (1999). The court 
found that in the early stages of 
addressing this issue, the United States 
Supreme Court regarded racially 
specific voir dire questions as being 
essential to the adherence of our 
criminaljustice system's notions of 
fairness andjustice. Hernandez, 357 
Md. at211, 742 A.2dat955 (citing 
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 
308,310 (1931». In Aldridge, the 
Court reversed a lower court's 
criminal conviction of an African-
American man based upon the lower 
court's refusal of the defendant's 
request for a voir dire question 
regarding race. !d. at 210, 742 A.2d 
at 955. In its holding, the United 
States Supreme Court noted that the 
"essential demands of fairness 
required the trial court to propound 
the requested questions in light of the 
non-remote possibility of 
disqualifying prejudice in the individual 
members of the jury." Id.at211, 742 
A.2d at 955 (quoting Aldridge, 283 
U.S. at 310). 
In examining later decisions of 
the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland found that the 
Court abandoned its earlier liberal 
application ofracially specific voir 
dire questions. Id.at211, 742A.2d 
at 955. In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 US. 
589 (1976), the Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction of an African-
American defendant for assault and 
battery and armed robbery of a 
Caucasian security guard, even after 
the trial court's refusal of defendant's 
voir dire request. In its holding, the 
Ristaino Court concluded that 
racially specific voir dire.questions 
are only appropriate in circumstances 
in which there is a "constitutionally 
significant likelihood that, absent 
questioning about racial prejudice, 
the jurors would not be as indifferent 
as they stand unsworne." Id. at 219, 
742 A.2d at 956 (quoting Ristaino, 
424 US. at 598). In analyzing the 
Supreme Court's reasoning for 
requiring the "special circumstances" 
standard, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland concluded that the Court 
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must view racial prejudice as a "latent 
attitude that becomes effective only 
under particular, racially charged 
circumstances." Id. at213, 742 A.2d 
at 956. 
The court of appeals further 
examined Rosales-Lopez v. United 
States, where a plurality of the Court 
added another dimension to the 
"special circumstances" standard. Id. 
at 213, 742 A.2d at 957 (citing 
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 
U.S. 182 (1981)). In that case, the 
Court noted that only in cases that 
dealt with violent interracial crime 
would there exist circumstances that 
would warrant racially specific voir 
dire questioning. Id. at 214, 742 A.2d 
at 957. The Rosales-Lopez court 
reasoned that in the absence ofthis 
standard, there would be an 
impression that 'justice in a court of 
law may turn upon the pigmentation 
of skin ( or) the accident of birth. " Id. 
(quoting Rosales, 451 U.S. at 190, 
(quoting Ristaino, 424 US. at 596)). 
Therefore, under current federal law, 
a trial court's refusal to propound 
racially specific voir dire questions in 
the absence of racially charged 
circumstances does not constitute 
reversible error. 
In examining Maryland law on 
this issue, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that in its most recent 
decision, they rejected the narrow 
federal position. Id. at214, 742 A.2d 
at 957 (citing to Hill v. State, 339 
Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995)). 
The court of appeals rejected prior 
federal precedent based upon the 
U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Ristaino: "the States are free to allow 
or require voir dire questions not 
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demanded by the US. Constitution." 
Id. at2I8, 742 A.2d at 959 (quoting 
Ristaino, 424 US. at 594). 
In Hill, the court of appeals 
embraced the Aldridge decision, thus 
characterizing a trial court's failure to 
propound requested voir dire 
questions as reversible error, even in 
the absence of a showing of potential 
juror bias. Id. at 219,742 A.2d at 
960. The court further reasoned that 
allowing per se racial voir dire 
questions would strengthen the 
criminal justice system by: (a) 
acknowledging that racial prejudice is 
a reality; (b) creating an impression 
that racial prejudice will not be 
tolerated; and (c) alleviating the need 
for trial judges to search the record 
for facts amounting to "special 
circumstances." Id. at221, 742 A.2d 
at 960-61. 
In finding Hill controlling, the 
court of appeals ruled that Hernandez 
was entitled to a racially specific voir 
dire question. Id. at 223,742 A.2d 
at 962. In so holding, the court 
explained that its decision applies to 
any defendant who requests race 
specific voir dire questions, regardless 
of their own race. Id. at 225, 742 
A.2d at 963. The court further noted 
that when a trial court is faced with a 
defendant who has improperly 
requested voir dire questions, it is 
incumbent upon the court to submit a 
question related to race on its own 
motion. Id. at 224,742 A.2d at 962. 
In light of the trial court's refusal to 
propound racially specific voir dire 
questions, as specifically requested by 
the defendant,. the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland ordered a new trial. Id. 
at231,742A.2dat967. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's ruling reflects the effect of 
potential racial prejUdice upon an 
accused's right to a fair trial as a 
primary, rather than secondary, 
concern of the courts. In light of this 
decision, Maryland practitioners need 
to be aware that, other than a simple 
request, there does not exist any 
prerequisite to receiving racially 
specific voir dire questions for their 
clients. Although per se racially 
specific voir dire questions will not 
eliminate the racial prejudices that 
inherently exist in our system, the court 
of appeals's approach will help to 
combat these prejUdices. 
